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INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the millennium, as radical transformations affect the ways
we produce, reproduce and organize our very existence, the challenges to
social and economic development seem, at times, overwhelming. What is
the nature of these transformations? What are the interests and forces
orienting them? What are the impacts of these transformations on the pro-
ductive and innovative capacities of developing countries? How can they
best face these challenges? What are the policy implications?
The aim of this book is to address these questions.
In what has come to be known as the ‘Knowledge Era’, the economy is
relying on knowledge-based activities much more than ever before. There
are at least three, interrelated, main arguments for this: (i) the proportion
of labour that handles tangible goods has become smaller than the propor-
tion engaged in the production, distribution and processing of knowledge;
(ii) the share of codified knowledge and information in the value of many
products and services is significantly increasing; (iii) knowledge-intensive
activities are rapidly growing.
Obviously, information and knowledge have always been important in
human history. But today’s knowledge is more and more codified and the
resulting information is more and more incorporated into goods and ser-
vices. The development and diffusion of a new techno-economic paradigm,
centred on information and communications technologies (ICT), have
accelerated and deepened both the codification of knowledge and the
spread of information. The extent, the velocity and the intensity of these
changes have provoked, on one hand, an unbridled and uncritical enthu-
siasm with the multiple possibilities apparently available to all and, on the
other, considerable perplexity as to how this transition actually affects
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social, economic and political processes and the best ways to deal with it.
As we shall see, the nature of the transformations – and, therefore, of the
challenges – is not always what it seems or is said to be. The first task, then,
is to explore the reality behind the myths and to understand the real pro-
cesses beyond the appearances and the rhetoric.
Part 1 discusses the main characteristics, threats and opportunities inher-
ent to these transformations and resulting policy implications, taking par-
ticularly into account the new international environment shaped by the
political context; process of economic liberalization; acceleration of the
process of globalization and competition; emergence of the ICT paradigm
and of the Knowledge Era. Different contributors here present new ways of
looking at and interpreting the contemporary situation. Most chapters aim
also at tackling the need to advance in the understanding of the specific
challenges posed to developing and industrializing countries in order to
design new types of policies, instruments and institutions adapted to their
own requirements. Some take a more theoretical and general approach,
others refer closely to specific experiences.
These efforts are particularly relevant due to the lack of an adequate
framework to capture and deal with the new configurations. It is precisely
this inadequacy that creates a fertile environment for the burgeoning of
myths and contradictory interpretations. One of the main arguments of
this book is that the specific features of the new pattern of development
expose even more clearly the limitations of traditional approaches, theories
and correlated indicators and statistical systems.
Moreover, our specific concern has been to develop new conceptual and
methodological approaches to understand the particular difficulties and
opportunities posed to developing countries and to design the guidelines
for implementing the necessary strategies and policies. Part 2 of this book
is aimed at filling this gap and explores the capacity of the systems of inno-
vation approach to deal with this challenge. This analytical framework has
the advantage of emphasizing historical, national and local trajectories and
the systemic and interactive nature of innovation and learning (understood
in a broad socioeconomic–political context with multiple sources and
actors). This second part of the book comprises some of the main findings
of our research project, set up with the objective of analysing experiences
of selected local productive arrangements in Brazil in the 1990s. Factors
affecting processes of learning, accumulation of productive capabilities, co-
operative behaviour, innovation and diffusion strategies of firms and evo-
lution of institutions were analysed.
The next section discusses some hidden aspects of current myths about
information technologies and the knowledge era, pointing to those conclu-
sions that are of particular interest for the issue of development. The third
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section examines the approach of systems of innovation, emphasizing the
advantages of the concept for the analysis of developing countries. The
fourth section introduces the concept of local productive arrangements and
systems (and correlated methodology) developed and perfected through
empirical research. The main objective here is to analyse how these arrange-
ments were affected by the changes of the 1990s, through the examination
of selected case studies in Brazil, presented in Part 2 of this book. The final
section offers some concluding remarks summing up our arguments and
suggestions toward the formulation of policies for developing countries.
BEYOND THE MYTHS
Is Information a Synonym of Knowledge?
In discussing the features of the new pattern of economic development,
almost all authors represented here stress the need to distinguish informa-
tion from knowledge. As put forward, for instance, by Johnson and
Lundvall (Chapter 5), information refers to codified knowledge and is
implied in the idea of ‘know what’. Knowledge implies the elaboration of
information and other inputs of all kinds to reach a new level, to ‘know
why’. This is why they propose a learning economy instead of a knowledge
economy, arguing that their concept: stresses the process more than the
product (that is, the stock of acquired knowledge) and, at the same time,
underlines the importance of personal contact and interaction as the basic
way to get access to new knowledge and technologies.1
The idea of a learning economy contrasts with other concepts stressing
the role of information and ICT, its production and circulation; mainly
because it refers to the social process of creation, acquisition, transforma-
tion, accumulation, diffusion, sharing (and also destruction) of specialized
knowledge. It is in this sense that the emphasis is on the capacity to learn
(as well as to forget) and to innovate as being crucial to the productivity and
competitiveness of economic agents, rather than on the capacity to acquire
and use new technical means.
In this book it is surely recognized that – with the spread of ICT, equip-
ment and systems – information and codified knowledge can be more
rapidly and easily produced and diffused throughout the world. However,
it is also understood that non-codified knowledge remains tacit and is only
transferred with interactive learning, through social, localized processes
embedded in specific environments and organizations. Tacit knowledge is
crucial not only to de-codify information and to make efficient use of these
new technologies, but more importantly to generate new knowledge, which
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depends on local capabilities. Therefore, as Humbert (Chapter 6) puts it,
the need to ‘distinguish between [information and communication] tech-
nologies that can be imported and innovation capabilities that must be
home grown as an outcome of the workings of a societal system’ (p. 000).
Since ‘knowledge society’ or ‘knowledge economy’ can, in some formula-
tions, imply that knowledge is already acquired and accessible to a society
as a whole, the idea of learning society seems especially interesting for devel-
oping countries because it emphasises the process of learning and, there-
fore, of change. Further advancing this issue, Arocena and Sutz (Chapter
11) propose that the concept of ‘learning societies’ should refer to ‘those
societies where a fair proportion of the population and of the social and
economic organizations permanently perform knowledge demanding
activities, which are such that many actors need to, and are able to, upgrade
their skills systematically’ (p. 000).
Is the Diffusion of ICT Leading to a New Sustainable Form of Economy?
Elaborating on the issue of a knowledge (not information) economy,
Freeman (Chapter 4) criticizes the myth that the diffusion of information
technology would improve the perfectibility of markets. The main argu-
ment here is that the confusion between information and knowledge has
also led to the misleading belief that the diffusion of ICT could provide
more perfect information to all agents in various markets. It is also argued
that information about price movements does not in itself convey under-
standing or predictability of market behaviour and trends. It is also noted
that, far from reducing uncertainty, the fast diffusion of ICT and related
innovations and transformations can actually increase it. And, as time goes
by, his observations become even more prophetic:
There is nothing in modern ICT, which eliminates uncertainty in relation to
investment behaviour, the most important source of instability in capitalist econ-
omies. The remarks of Keynes about expeditions to the South Pole remain as
true today as when he first wrote them. Perhaps . . . [these] expeditions have
become less risky and have almost become routine. Not so, investments in
Dot.Com companies. (p. 000)
In demystifying the idea that the diffusion of ICT could impart a long-
lasting high-growth trend to the United States economy and render it less
vulnerable to cyclical phenomena, Freeman’s conclusions in Chapter 4 con-
verge with those of Chesnais and Sauviat (Chapter 3) and of Johnson and
Lundvall (Chapter 5). While not underestimating the upward thrust from
ICT and the special features that supposedly render the US economy more
competitive and stable, most arguments here also include a critique of the
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ideological use of the term ‘new economy’ and the perspective that it points
to a future of world stable prosperity led by the US. It is also emphasized
that, although there are important justifications for the optimism in relation
to changes associated to the diffusion of new technologies, there is less jus-
tification for underestimating the economic turmoil accompanying them.
Along this line, Freeman notes that the diagnosis and expectations that
influential politicians, academics, bankers and industrialists in the US had
about the economy in the 1920s are taken as a clear example of how the
euphoria produced during a boom can distort the judgement even of those
better informed participants and observers. He recalls his and Carlota
Perez’s argument that present problems regarding structural unemploy-
ment and the slowing down of productivity result from the incompatibility
between new technologies and subsisting social and organizational systems.
Of course, in this discussion it is important to take into account the alert
made by Chesnais and Sauviat about opportunistic behaviour, which some-
times appears ‘baptized with the friendly and modern term institutional
innovation’ (Chapter 3, p. 000) and has fed ideological justifications for the
reduction of the welfare state or for the flexibilization of work. This points
to what authors like Santos (1994), insisted on, regarding the need to dis-
tinguish two different meanings of ‘mode’. In periods of radical and per-
vasive transformations what is sometimes seen as characteristic of the new
phase (mode) may be just a partial and biased interpretation (fashion) of
what is still difficult to perceive and define. The 1990s witnessed some of
these fashionable ideas, ranging from downsizing and reengineering to the
Dow 36000.
Freeman’s chapter – as most of the others, written in the first quarter of
2000 – discusses centrally the risks (and consequences) of a hard landing
for the US economy, alerting that (i) euphoric ideas about the inauguration
of ‘new economies’ are reborn in every big technological revolution; and
that (ii) exaggerated expectations about the future of radical new technol-
ogies are just as inevitable as the collapse of those expectations.2
These alerts converge with other conclusions about the strong and weak
points of the US productive and innovation system and of its sustainabil-
ity in the long run. Johnson and Lundvall (Chapter 5) point mainly to the
massive inflow and use of unskilled illegal workers and to the overestimated
role of the hi-tech sectors. Chesnais and Sauviat (Chapter 3) reinforce these
arguments, stressing that the myths about a ‘new economy’ tend to conceal
the fact that innovation and development depend much more on the diffu-
sion of knowledge than on information technologies.
Actually, different arguments in this book alert that, far from a real diffu-
sion of knowledge, the ‘new economy’ reflects the reinforcement of the trend
towards ‘privatization’, ‘capitalization’ and ‘commoditization’ of knowledge.
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Knowledge or Ignorance Era?
Chesnais and Sauviat (Chapter 3) draw attention to the need to reflect
about the specificities and consequences of the advent and diffusion of the
new pattern of economic accumulation taking into account its social, polit-
ical – and ideological – context. They contrast the regime in place since the
end of World War II with the present finance-dominated accumulation
regime, in which:
● governments, in most countries, have accepted (or have been forced)
to decrease their capacity to command the process of decision-
making regarding investments, specially those with large structuring
effects;
● adaptive strategies for R&D, skill formation and investment (rather
than innovative ones) prevail even in industries where R&D continue
to be financed by large firms;
● most of the processes of restructuring, privatization, acquisitions
and mergers have led to the dismantling of technological capacity.
The result is that stronger priority has been given to activities aiming at
maximizing short-run returns on investment (such as ‘downsizing’) rather
than those that have a longer payback period such as education and train-
ing of human resources and R&D.3 Therefore, they point to the reduction
of innovation-related investment and alert to the effects of this trend on the
overall capacity of the system to produce knowledge and innovation in the
future. Additionally, it is argued that this change is sustained, in the short
run, by the exploitation of capabilities accumulated in the past, mainly
through technological alliances and acquisition of capabilities in univer-
sities and public R&D institutes.
These authors also make an important association between the finance-
dominated accumulation regime and the development and diffusion of
ICT, pointing out that the capacity of the productive system to cope with
the new growth requirements is directly related to an extremely efficient use
of these new technologies. They single out the unique position of the US
within the new regime, and recalling the ‘new economy’ arguments, they
maintain that these contribute to falsify its negative effects on innovation.
Discussing the increasing pressure towards privatization and ‘commodi-
tization’ of knowledge, Johnson and Lundvall stress the inherent contra-
dictions of this process and also alert that this may undermine some of the
most important contemporary forms of creation and use of knowledge.
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Knowledge is socially produced in narrow and broad networks, which may be
destroyed or at least damaged by a commoditization of knowledge. Growth in
the learning economy feeds upon social capital. But if left to itself, it tends to
undermine the very same social capital that it feeds upon. . . . the very rapidity
of change may lead to a misallocation of resources in the sense that too little
resources are used to pursue long-term objectives and the production of generic
knowledge while too much is used to speed-up the movement along known tra-
jectories. (Chapter 5, p. 000)
Freeman (Chapter 4) also calls attention to the trend towards ‘capitaliza-
tion’ of knowledge – criticizing those who claim that this is the new mission
of the ‘modern university’. The main critique here is that what is mistaken
by some as ‘modern’ (an institutional innovation associated to the new par-
adigm) is in fact the result of the pressures to privatize knowledge. He alerts
to the risks of a decline in the quality of more fundamental research as well
as in the quality of patents, recalling the new pressures to ‘patent or perish’,
in addition to the older ‘publish or perish’. In this case, we would empha-
size the simultaneity and contradiction of these two pressures: to patent
and publish; that is, that university activities tend to be pulled simultane-
ously in opposite directions.
This alert converges with one of the most interesting reflections made in
this book: the consequences of pressures based on diametrically different
concepts of knowledge – private and public; individual or collective. All
over the world, these pressures are substantially altering traditional forms
and infrastructure used to generate and diffuse knowledge. An implicit idea
of several chapters in this volume is that in fact the present trends may be
pointing more in the direction of an ignorance era, rather than a knowl-
edge era. Important questions and alerts are made in Part 1 of this book
concerning these trends. As all the authors are actually experiencing such
transformations in our own work environment, we are among the first to
enquire as to what are the expected consequences, and what should be the
new role of universities and research centres.
Pointing out the pressures and risks of the development of an ‘education
industry’, Petit explores the trends related to its linkages with ICT and the
acceleration of globalization:
education, itself an industry, has tended to develop its international markets,
attracting students from abroad with specific marketing and programmes and
developing local subsidiaries and joint ventures. ICT are helping all these exten-
sions. The potential of international development of these activities . . . seems
noticeably important, all of which put the brain drain phenomenon in a new
context. (Chapter 2, p. 000)
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Arocena and Sutz also manifest their concern about budgetary and ideo-
logical pressures forcing a more direct relationship between universities and
the market, emphasizing that this problems is ever more serious in develop-
ing countries.
To be able to continue their research activities, universities and university
researchers in Latin America must ‘sell or die’. Moreover, the collaboration with
enterprises tends to be seen by government and other sectors, particularly the
mass media, as a must for universities if they have to be considered committed
to the nation’s fate. (Chapter 11, p. 000)
Along the same lines, Chesnais and Sauviat (Chapter 3) criticize the
‘short-sighted apology of a market-dominated conception of higher edu-
cation and research’ – and warn that the pressures are not only financial.
They are also ideological, under the recurrent slogan that ‘everything the
state did or still does the private sector, whether domestic or foreign, can do
better’. In this sense, they point to the strength of the new ‘theoretical’ pres-
sures to ‘open and modernize’ what they call the ‘Republic of Knowledge’.4
They also make a more general alert that knowledge itself, in increasingly
becoming a ‘private property’, has its role as an instrument of exclusion (as
it replicates dominant geo-political and social structures) reinforced.
Is There a Trend Towards Globalisation or Exclusion?
One of the most debated aspects of the recent changes occurring in the
world is the acceleration of globalization of the economy and of knowl-
edge. This process has been intensified by the expansion of new patterns of
production, distribution and exchange based on the diffusion of ICT,
allowing the interconnection of different and distant geographical parts of
the world in real time and the communication and exchange of information
in a way never experienced before. However, at the same time that we
witness an amplification of the globalization process, a trend in the oppo-
site direction is noticed. Together with the new possibilities offered by the
increasing diffusion of ICT, new forms of social polarization and economic
exclusion can be created. These are linked with unequal access to new prod-
ucts and services and opportunities to acquire and renew knowledge bases
and skills, which are required to make use of them.
Instead of globalization, available evidence (i) shows that a significant
concentration of trade, production and technology flows in more advanced
countries – and particularly those belonging to the so-called Triad – per-
sists;5 and (ii) suggests globalization (Humbert) and even re-concentration
of knowledge and other strategic activities for firms and countries, related
to planning and decision-making activities. Therefore, some few countries
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and firms act as the main generators of knowledge, new technologies and
higher value added goods and services, with the vast majority being rele-
gated to the role of passive users.
In this volume, and specifically regarding innovation and technology
flows, Humbert (Chapter 6) also reinforces the conclusions that technology
generation keeps being localized in specific parts of the world with no evi-
dence regarding a de-concentration of these flows. In the Brazilian case, the
author quotes analyses indicating the trend towards an exclusion of the
country from global technology generation. Recalling the distinctions
made above, it can be observed that the commoditization – and privatiza-
tion – of knowledge tend to reinforce a concentration in the developed
countries, which reproduces already existent geo-political patterns of
inequality. In this sense, different authors in this book understand global-
ization as a more recent stage of an old historical process of international-
ization of capital. Chesnais and Sauviat, for instance, argue in Chapter 3
that what is in fact observed is a movement of financial globalization, sup-
ported by ICT, and the search for an expansion of production and consu-
mer markets, therefore the interest in expanding the reach of these new
technologies and systems – especially the Internet – to all corners of the
world.
Most authors in this volume agree that the advent and diffusion of the
new ICT paradigm and accumulation regime have brought opportunities
and threats to all countries, but particularly to those less developed.
Chesnais and Sauviat are even less optimistic in their analysis of the
impacts on the cohesion and the longevity of national and local systems of
innovation in countries not belonging to the Triad nor possessing devel-
oped science and technology systems with a capacity for autonomous self-
reproduction.
Arocena and Sutz also make explicit their preoccupation that inequal-
ities between more and less developed countries may still increase. They
stress that this widening of the gap refers not only to accessing and using
new technologies (the ‘digital divide’) but, most important, to the capacity
to learn, absorb and generate new knowledge and innovation (the ‘learning
divide’), as well as to the opportunity to use them.
We argue that this [focus on the digital divide] is a particularly misleading way
of conceptualizing the actual problems of underdeveloped countries and of
underdeveloped people. Of course, ICT and the Internet can be extremely useful
tools in the many fronts of the fight against the flaws of poverty and isolation
that accompany underdevelopment. However, putting the main emphasis on
them is another example of the simplistic technological determinism that has so
often inspired technocratic recommendations, historically incapable of redress-
ing in a sustainable way the persistence of underdevelopment. We assert that the
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digital divide is an important but comparatively small component of the learn-
ing divide, where development divides are deeply rooted. (Chapter 11, p. 000)
In the sense of contributing to minimize these negative effects of the glo-
balization process, the importance is pointed out of centring the support to
the diffusion of ICT on stimulating learning processes with the participa-
tion of local agents in networks, respecting the specific conditions of each
country and region (Petit, Chapter 2; Humbert, Chapter 6). For develop-
ing countries, important issues refer to the existing workforce, its reduced
levels of qualification and capabilities, and the brain drain. In a line similar
to Arocena and Sutz’s (Chapter 11) definition of the ‘learning society’, Petit
(Chapter 2) warns that the ‘rising inequality has been re-enforced by
inequality in knowledge and education’ and sees this process as a threat.
Foray and Lundvall (1996) had also drawn attention to the risk of threat-
ening social cohesion, if policies neglected the social and distributional
dimension and the importance of promoting competences and learning
capabilities as central elements in any strategy aiming at limiting the degree
of social exclusion. They mainly warned of the risk of IT becoming an
acronym for ‘intellectual tribalism’ instead of ‘information technology’.
Reinforcing their arguments about the digital, learning and development
divides, Arocena and Sutz emphasize the need to take into account both
the opportunity to learn and the opportunity to apply creatively what has
been learnt. In this sense they note that ‘educational policies, even if fun-
damental, are not enough if people are not allowed to deploy its creativity,
enhanced by formal training, into problem solving activities’ (Chapter 11,
p. 000).
Advancing further in the discussion of the consequences of the pressure
towards privatization of knowledge, David and Foray (2002) recall that the
appropriation of knowledge cannot be placed on an equal base with phys-
ical property, because knowledge and information are non-rival in use.
They may be used repeatedly and concurrently by many people without
being depleted. In fact, unlike energy and materials, information and
knowledge are resources which are (more than abundant) inexhaustible.
Their consumption does not destroy them; and when they are sold, trans-
ferred or given, this does not mean that they are lost. Despite this, they
argue that ‘individuals and firms today are striving to create artificial scar-
cities – by achieving legally sanctioned monopolies of the use of informa-
tion – in fields where abundance naturally prevails, thus giving rise to an
enormous amount of waste’ (p. 14). However, even more important are the
consequences in terms of further exclusion and development division. In a
similar vein, we would argue that attempts to privatize and to create scar-
city of knowledge are also associated with efforts to control and use it as
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an instrument of power. The implications of this process for the consolida-
tion of a new form of geo-politics have to be taken into account.
Have National and Local Policies Become Obsolete?
The spread of simplistic ideas about globalization has also been accompa-
nied by two main hypotheses. First, that in the ‘new economy’, economic
and technological development was following a supposedly natural, pro-
gressive and unequivocal trend. Secondly, that local and national specific-
ities would disappear and the role of policies (in general, and government
policies in particular) would have no relevance. The arguments developed
in this book converge regarding three main points in criticizing these
hypotheses.
The first is that the agenda for policies – as put forward by most contrib-
utors to Part 1 – has become extended and even more complex rather than
being made obsolete in the Knowledge Economy. Petit, for instance, refers
to the need for ‘more sophisticated and differentiated policy designing in
accordance with the new context’ (Chapter 2, p. 000). Pointing out that three
main structural changes – the diffusion of ICTs, education and internation-
alization – are at the centre of the new contemporary policy issues, Petit
explores their linkages and interdependencies. A number of other sugges-
tions are given by different authors in this volume. The specific threats to
and needs of the developing world, highlighting the arguments put forward
in Part 1 (mainly by Coutinho, Chapter 12; Arocena and Sutz, Chapter 11;
Diniz, Chapter 7; Schmitz, Chapter 10; and Mytelka and Farinelli, Chapter
9), as well as those by the Brazilian authors in Part 2 are discussed later.
Also, and as already seen, particularly in the case of promotion of ICT, the
role of governments in the most advanced countries has been far from the
passive non-interventionist stance rhetorically assumed. The fact that this has
been especially true in the case of the US has contributed to place their socio-
economic institutions and policies as representing an international ‘bench-
mark’; that is, a model that other countries should follow. However, this book
argues that even if the US model were safe from risks, it certainly could not
be reproduced and generalized. Specific and meaningful reference has been
made to the case of venture capital in the US to illustrate that it is not trans-
ferable to economies that enjoy neither few or none of its peculiar privileges
nor the particularities of its socio-economic institutions (Freeman, Chapter
4; Chesnais and Sauviat, Chapter 3; Johnson and Lundvall, Chapter 5).
These remarks take us to the second point of convergence: the recognition
that national and local conditions may lead to completely different paths and
to a growing diversity instead of the standardization and convergence
suggested by the more radical theses about the influence of globalization on
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national and sub-national systems. As emphasized, for instance, by Celso
Furtado,
globalisation is very far from conducting to the adoption of uniform policies.
The mirage of a world behaving under the same rules dictated by a super IMF
exists only in the imagination of some people. The disparities among economies
are due not only to economic factors but, most importantly to diversity in cul-
tural matrices and historical particularities. (1998: 74)
There is not only one solution and policy prescription, but rather a myriad
of alternatives that could take different forms for different societies in
different places and times.
The third point of convergence is on the understanding that the
‘Knowledge Era’ does not result from any neutral, natural or uncontrolla-
ble progressive force. Both the upsurge and diffusion of the new techno-
economic paradigm and the acceleration of the globalization process result
from (and reflect) political and institutional changes which have character-
ized the environment of the most developed countries in the second half of
the 20th century. These changes have also oriented processes of deregula-
tion, privatization and liberalization world-wide, supposedly associated
with increasing needs of greater competitiveness, within an ideological
framework that accepted no alternative.
As pointed out by Humbert ‘the present neo-liberal promotion of global-
ization is a clear call for dismantling all barriers so that the nation-state ter-
ritorial production apparatus of any country becomes open to any actors of
the global system’ (Chapter 6, p. 000). This author also recalls and discusses
the slogan ‘join the global train immediately or you’re finished!’ and the
reactions it has provoked.6 Arocena and Sutz further develop this issue in
Chapter 11, discussing the consequences for development of this hegemonic
and globalized thought; exploring the challenges of avoiding both the ‘inte-
gration’ and ‘apocalypse’ visions; and pointing to the need to escape from
this trap. They discuss the reasons why ‘Southern frameworks of thought’
developed in the 1950s and 1960s (‘ECLA structuralism’ and ‘dependency
theory’) have not been replaced by a new holistic view, noting that
perhaps, as hegemonic thinking would claim, because there is no need for
‘regional’ frameworks of thought any more. Alternatively, it is possible to claim
that they are indeed needed but that hegemonic thinking makes it very difficult
to build them. (p. 000)
One of the main arguments of their chapter is that, despite the difficulties,
a ‘Southern framework of thought’ is fundamental to the analysis of devel-
opment problems related to knowledge, innovation and learning
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Also, contrary to the ‘no alternative’ thesis, some authors emphasize the
need to understand the features of the present accumulation pattern and to
design new policies and regulation regimes to orient growth and develop-
ment. Along this line, Freeman points to the ‘need for political regulation to
limit or prevent undesirable social consequences of any new technology’
(Chapter 4, p. 000). It is also in this direction that we understand the propo-
sition – put forward in Part 1 of this book – of implementing a ‘new new deal’
(Johnson and Lundvall, Chapter 5) and of maintaining economic and social
cohesion (Petit, Chapter 2). It is important in this discussion to re-emphasize
that policies targeting the learning issue are much more complicated when
knowledge is seen as the main resource and learning the main process of eco-
nomic development (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994) and cannot be taken in
isolation from issues of economic, social and political power.
In a more general train of thought, Freeman notes that the reach and
uncertainties associated with the diffusion of new technological systems
justify why research on innovation systems is so difficult yet so important for
policy-making: ‘What is needed for this extremely difficult task of strategic
policy-making is not just information but knowledge and understanding of
the relevant system’ (Chapter 4, p. 000). He and most authors in this book
are concerned with investigating what new policies and policy tools would
help in coping with the transformations discussed above, as well as be more
adequate in stimulating industrial and innovative development. The develop-
ment of the concept of national system of innovation in the mid-1980s rep-
resents an attempt towards this aim (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1985).
THE USEFULNESS OF THE CONCEPT OF A SYSTEM
OF INNOVATION
As pointed out in this book, underlying the system of innovation approach
is:
● a resurgence of the interest in historical and national trajectories and
in technical change;
● a characterization of innovation and learning in a broader context
and as interactive processes with multiple sources;
● an emphasis on the importance of and complementarity between
incremental and radical, technical and organizational innovations
and their different internal and external sources;
● re-conceptualization of the firm as a learning organization embed-
ded within a broader socioeconomic–political environment reflecting
historical and cultural trajectories;
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● a focus on the localized (and national) nature of the generation,
assimilation and diffusion of innovation, as opposed to the simplis-
tic idea of a supposed techno-globalism;
● an observance of the systemic nature of innovation and the impor-
tance of taking into account the productive, financial, social, institu-
tional and political spheres, as well as micro, meso and macro
dimensions;
● an emphasis on the importance of this concept for developing coun-
tries.
We will now highlight some of the main contributions of this book in the
discussion of these features.
A New Understanding of the Role and Characteristics of Innovation
As particularly emphasized in Chapter 9 by Mytelka and Farinelli, the
innovation system approach breaks ranks with the traditional view of inno-
vation as a process of radical change at the frontier of an industry; and rec-
ognizes that innovation extends beyond formal research and development
(R&D).
Regarding the first point, and even while recognizing the central impor-
tance of ICT in the new accumulation pattern, most authors of this book
consider that innovation, and hence development, are not confined to the
new high-tech sectors. Mytelka and Farinelli provide conceptual and
empirical support for this idea when they show how knowledge and inno-
vation are radically transforming traditional industries.7 Analysing Danish
and Italian agglomerations of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), they
stress how these firms, collectively and as part of larger networks, are often
very innovative, particularly regarding the development of new products.
Saviotti also points out that ‘the growing knowledge intensity of our econ-
omies demands a greater amount of search activities even for entry and for
continued participation in traditional sectors’ (Chapter 8, p. 000), implying
that knowledge is indispensable in all economic activities, regardless of
their being low- or high-tech. One consequence of this discussion is that the
inadequacies of the traditional classification of economic sectors are
becoming more and more evident. In fact, traditional vision based on
sectors does not capture situations where the frontiers of industries are con-
stantly changing and where market structures are becoming increasingly
fluid. In a dynamic perspective, although technologies are highly influenced
by sectoral technological paths, innovation is ever more influenced by
knowledge and capabilities of different productive activities and scientific
areas.
14 Systems of innovation and development
The recognition that innovation extends beyond formal R&D activities,
in its turn, emphasizes the importance of also taking into account contin-
uous improvement in product design and quality; changes in organization
and management routines; and creativity in marketing and modifications
to production processes that reduce costs, increase efficiency and ensure
environmental sustainability. Mytelka and Farinelli propose that innova-
tion should then be understood as ‘the process by which firms master and
implement the design and production of goods and services that are new to
them, irrespective of whether or not they are new to their competitors –
domestic or foreign’ (Chapter 9, p. 000). This understanding, as they stress,
helps to avoid an overemphasis on R&D in the innovation process, encour-
aging policy-makers to take a broader perspective on the opportunities for
learning and innovation in SME and in the so-called traditional industries.
More than that and as we propose to explore later in this chapter, such a
definition – that Mytelka has introduced in previous work – is particularly
important for the analysis of innovation in less developed countries, and
that is one of the reasons why the approach of a system of innovation and
this broader concept of innovation is adopted in this book and orients the
research agenda of RedeSist.8
It is worth pointing out that the recognition of these advantages does not
impede us from appreciating the warnings given in Chapter 3 by Chesnais
and Sauviat about the links between the global finance-dominated regime
and this broader concept of innovation and innovation-related investments
– which stresses mainly ‘the marketing of new (or apparently new) products’
– as well as the possible consequences to long-term education and R&D
investment, and particularly to the fundamental research base.
Importance of Social, Political and Institutional Contexts
As highlighted in Chapter 3 by Chesnais and Sauviat, the system of inno-
vation approach emphasizes the importance of taking into consideration
the historical, political and national trajectories.9 On the other hand,
Mytelka and Farinelli (Chapter 9) note that this conceptual framework
stresses the process in which enterprises – in interaction with each other and
with other institutions – play a key role in bringing new products, new pro-
cesses and new forms of organisation into economic use. According to
Freeman (Chapter 4), new forms of organization of production are related
to new forms of social political organization. This is a slow process of re-
establishment of an organic coherence, or compatibility – which is dynamic
and not stable – between the mode of production and the social and polit-
ical relations associated with it.
Since technological change is increasingly based on the production and
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diffusion of knowledge, development depends on the degree and the mode
of accumulation and distribution of knowledge. Therefore, in the context
of the new techno-economic paradigm, the generation and use of knowl-
edge and the reduction of social inequalities become connected and recip-
rocally indispensable. The necessary strategies will depend on the capacity
for technological and social innovation – in a country, a region, a commu-
nity. This capacity is configured by social conditions existing in the cultu-
ral and institutional environment, more than by the availability of material
resources. The immaterial changes, which occur in the production of intan-
gibles as well as in material production, generate social change – hence the
possibility of development. A country’s (or region’s) innovative capacity
derives from the relations among its social actors, movements, organiza-
tions and institutions. And this capacity is its ability to make the most ade-
quate choices, and to apply the results of those choices where they will be
most productive, socially and economically. Historically defined cultural
and institutional conditions are crucial in determining those choices. It is
in this sense that the national system of innovation approach reinforces the
thesis that the generation of innovation is localized and bound to national
and regional frontiers, contrasting with the idea of a supposed techno-
globalism. Since a significant portion of knowledge on which the innova-
tion process is based is tacit, cumulative and localized, endogenous
technological capabilities are required for the efficient absorption of knowl-
edge, in order to adapt, modify and then generate, new knowledge.
The presumed globalization of the new techno-economic paradigm dis-
guises the world-wide diversity of local and national solutions to economic
problems. After all, ‘the market’ as a universal mechanism of co-ordination
is an abstraction. To understand the possibilities of innovation, it is neces-
sary to understand ‘markets’ (plural) as social structures built throughout
history by social relations in specific institutional contexts. This is what is
usually meant by ‘embeddedness’: the fact that all economic decisions and
actions are embedded in the social context where they originate. It is signifi-
cant that most of the authors in this book refer to the specificities of the
social environments in which innovation occurs.
Thus the specific choices and characteristics of innovation in each
country reveal complex and differentiated compositions of political–insti-
tutional arrangements, entrepreneurial cultures, social organizations, iden-
tities and citizenship construction. In fact, local culture is crucial in various
processes of technical and related change due to the tacit and localized
character of knowledge and the need to share language, trust and the
feeling of belonging to the same community, allowing for interfirm com-
munication and co-operation. This sense of identity and of common goals
stimulates interaction and co-operation within a specific local culture of
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norms and values – in other words, social capital.10 In a similar vein,
Humbert uses the expression ‘societal capabilities for technical change or
innovation’ in Chapter 6 as a component of the innovation environment in
his attempt to situate the process in its social context. The expression clearly
translates the effort to understand the characteristics that are specific to a
cultural and institutional environment where innovation does – or does not
– occur.
Of the work presented in this book, the greatest emphasis on trying to
define social capital is that of Johnson and Lundvall: ‘social capital is a set
of mostly informal institutions (social habits and norms), which affect the
levels of trust, interacting and learning in a social system and cannot be
accumulated in a straightforward way’ (Chapter 5, p. 000). They suggest
that social capital, together with learning processes, are the key to develop-
ment strategies. Thus ‘social capital’ – the fabric on which the complex web
of human creativity and innovative capacity can develop – is a complex set
of norms, behaviour, values and tacit knowledge, historically and culturally
constructed in each society.
This understanding is crucial to the analysis of innovation in developing
countries, especially in Latin America, where certain cultural characteris-
tics have often been considered as obstacles for development, such as per-
sonalistic and affective relations interfering in what ‘should’ be rationalistic
and impersonal economic decisions. But values such as trust and loyalty are
now repeatedly being considered as fundamental in the new paradigm and
the relational society seems to be more attuned to the times, the spaces and
the articulations of social and productive systems in transformation. In
many cases, abilities – which have developed through history in order to
cope with extraordinary difficulties – result in a capacity for flexibility and
agile response to challenges, considered ‘competitive advantages’ in the
contemporary economy.
The point here reinforces the argument that there is not one unique
‘model’ to be imperatively followed, and that no culture has a monopoly on
the factors for successful socio-economic development. Each case must be
studied according to its peculiarities, its specific characteristics, and the
international context – with its limitations and opportunities – in order to
evaluate what should be its own, specific, strategies and mode of develop-
ment.
Guided by the lemma ‘context matters’, Arocena and Sutz discuss the
differences concerning knowledge and innovation in the North and in the
Latin American south. These authors stress the advantage of the concept
of a national system of innovation as an analytical ‘focusing device’ for
the ‘centre’ and also the ‘periphery’: ‘Moreover, it helps to understand the
knowledge and innovation distances between both realities; in fact, the
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concept itself shows differences when analysed from the South’ (Chapter
11, p. 000).
Financial Dimension
Schumpeter (1912), in his Theory of Economic Development, recognized
that for entrepreneurs to become the driving force in a process of innova-
tion, they must be able to convince banks to provide the credit to finance
innovation. In this sense, any discussion about innovation systems has to
include the financial dimension. However, even if the conceptualization of
systems of innovation has recognized the importance of finance, subse-
quent works have failed to include it in any significant way.
In Chapter 3, Chesnais and Sauviat point out the lack of concern for the
conditions under which key participants in systems of innovation – firms,
governments, and teaching, research and development institutions –
command the necessary finance allowing them to undertake long-term
innovation-related investment. They propose that a foundation for a fruit-
ful intellectual alliance should lie in recognizing the logic of the finance-
dominated accumulation regime and its influence on innovation systems.
As seen above, their main argument is that the present logic of the finance-
dominated accumulation regime is responsible for the relatively low prior-
ity given by productive firms to long-run concerns, neglecting those
activities that have a longer payback period, such as expenditure on human
resources, R&D and innovation.
Taking into account this general picture of the world economy, one
should reflect on the characteristics of financing and innovation that are
specific to the developing world. Particularly stressed in this book is the fact
that the financial dimension constitutes a very important factor for under-
standing the limits and possibilities of increasing competitiveness and
innovative capabilities of local systems in the developing countries. Specific
examples are given in Part 2, with the discussion of different productive
arrangements in Brazil. In Part 1 this issue is also further discussed by
Saviotti (Chapter 8), who exploits the limits of the institutional infrastruc-
ture for financing innovation in these countries. He suggests that institu-
tional innovations involve two distinct lines of action. On the one hand,
there are institutional mechanisms that guarantee the search for new niches
or ‘windows of opportunity’ for generating innovations in the economy. On
the other hand is the necessary existence of an institutional infrastructure
to finance innovation.
Although this is a general problem, it is recognized to assume a larger
dimension in the context of developing countries, where the inadequacy of
both financial infrastructures and mechanisms for financing innovation
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(and in some cases even industrial development) is very often a marked
characteristic. Most of these countries do not have ‘functional financial
structures’, in the sense that private banks are not used to provide finance
for long-term investment.11 Of course we believe that this inadequacy has
to be understood in a broader context as that further discussed here mainly
by Coutinho (Chapter 12); Arocena and Sutz (chapter 11); and Chesnais
and Sauviat (Chapter 3).
In Chapter 9, Mytelka and Farinelli advance in the direction of propos-
ing both an institutional infrastructure and mechanisms for financing
industrial development and innovation in less developed countries. Their
basic idea is to target collective agents instead of individual firms. They
propose the creation of cluster banks, embedded within local systems of
innovation, aimed at fostering learning, specialization and innovation. The
main argument here is that this would be particularly important in the
restructuring and development of productive systems where SMEs are crit-
ical actors.12
The systemic approach provides a means of contextualizing these sug-
gestions regarding the financial dimension of innovation systems in a
broader context, which is at the same time specific and localised. It also
offers a bridge between the micro-, meso- and macroeconomic spheres.
Micro–Macro Relationship
Analysing national and local systems of innovation, Freeman (Chapter 4)
emphasizes the importance of taking into consideration its micro, meso
and macro dimensions, as well as their linkages. He shows that the frailties
of the so-called new economy – which are not usually discussed precisely
due to the missing link between micro and macro on the analytical level –
point to the mistake of considering that an entire economic system can
stand on a single set of technologies (in this case, ICT). By not considering
the complexity of the entire array of social, economic and political struc-
tures which underlie them, calling for an equally complex and multidisci-
plinary treatment, the approach of mainstream economics cannot perceive
the real sense – as meaning and as direction – of the new developments.
Similarly, Coutinho (Chapter 12) criticizes neo-classical theories, which
reduce the macro dimension to a mere sum of the microeconomic short-run
outcomes and adds that ‘the specific characteristics of macroeconomic
systems contain and condition the microeconomic decisions that form the
standards of financing, corporate governance, international trade, competi-
tion and technical change’ (p. 000). Making this issue the centre of his
chapter, Coutinho discusses the influence of the micro-, meso- and macro-
economic dimensions and relationships on firms’ behaviour, regarding
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especially their investment in productive and innovative capacities. Focusing
on the Brazilian case, he discusses the specificities of the macroeconomic
context of the 1990s (similar to other developing countries) resulting from
the acceleration of financial globalization; as well as how this new context
imposes even more serious limits on development policies.
The need to bridge the gap between micro and macro analyses finds a
response in the systems of innovation approach and is especially relevant
in the case of developing countries, given the peculiarities of their macro
environments.
Systems of Innovation and Developing Countries
The systems of innovation approach has been criticized for the absence of
formalization. However, it could be argued that the development of this
approach did not intend to create a theory in itself but rather to provide a
useful framework for analysing innovation dynamics. Additionally, it does
not put innovation and learning processes into a strait-jacket model devel-
oped according to the specific experience of one (or a few) advanced coun-
tries, which could hardly be reproduced even in other economies in the
North, not to mention the South. Therefore, what is seen by some as a dis-
advantage is here considered as the main element in providing a flexible and
useful conceptual, methodological and analytical framework.
From the specific point of view of less developed countries (LDCs) the
usefulness of this approach resides precisely in the fact that its central build-
ing blocks – diversity of social, economic and political agents and contexts;
systemic approach, observance of micro, meso and macro relationships, etc.
– allow for their specificities to be taken into account. Of particular relevance
is the emphasis on the importance of innovation for the sustainable compet-
itiveness of these countries and not traditional advantages such as low
labour cost and natural resources, which Fajnzylber (1988) called ‘spurious
competitiveness’. Furthermore, understanding innovation as a localized,
context specific and socially determined process allows the demystifying of
ideas about the possibilities of generating, acquiring and diffusing technol-
ogies in less developed countries. It makes clear, for instance, that acquisition
of technology abroad is not a substitute for local efforts. On the contrary, one
needs a lot of knowledge to be able to interpret information, select, buy (or
copy), transform and internalize technology. Actually, it seems at least naïve
to think that any firm would be willing to ‘transfer’ (or to share) precisely the
main strategic competitive asset of the knowledge era. In this sense, ideas
that technology is becoming a global commodity run totally against what is
found today, with the pressures to privatize and control knowledge, as dis-
cussed above.
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Also important is the need to understand the specific conditions for
financing innovation in less developed countries. All these and particularly
the former, lead us to the relevance of linking micro, meso and macro
dimensions of systems of innovation in the developing world. As pointed
out by a number of Latin American and Caribbean authors, also of signifi-
cant importance is to take into account the problems related to the instabil-
ity and vulnerability of the macroeconomic, political, institutional and
financial environments, which have been a marked characteristic of less
developed countries. Additionally, some of them point to problems such as
hyperinflation, high external debt and high interest rates as common
important constraints to technological (and productive) development in
these countries.13 One main argument here is that macroeconomic contexts
in developing countries are of much greater importance than specific inno-
vation policies. That is why they are called ‘implicit’ technology policies.14
And as Chesnais and Sauviat stress in Chapter 3, those contexts can be
better understood if one takes into account the logic of the regulation
regime, as in the case of the present (dominated by finance).
In Chapter 12, Coutinho goes further into the discussion of the specific-
ities of the 1980s and 1990s contexts in countries like Brazil. He shows how,
far from being neutral, interest rates and exchange rate policies – as well as
their self-supporting interaction – impact directly on the core of the micro-
economic business calculus, that is, on the essence of capital management.
Coutinho also argues that economies that are subject to high rates of inter-
est as a result of their macroeconomic systems place additional penalties
on companies operating within them and emphasizes that ‘if in addition to
high levels of basic interest rates, the economy in question is classified as a
country with high exchange rate risk (“Country Risk”) its business sector
is penalized even more heavily’ (p. 000). His point is that, under a more glo-
balized regime, the freedom to manoeuvre in determining interest
rate/exchange rate policy depends even more on the foreign exchange posi-
tion of the economies, both in terms of stocks (position as a credi-
tor/debtor nation) as well as flows (surplus/deficit in the current account).
As a consequence, to cope well with ‘financial globalization’ he recom-
mends developing the means to avoid depending too much on it. His argu-
ment is that those countries with a more developed national innovation
system will find themselves in a better position if they are in equilibrium or
have a superavit in their balance of payments (as well as foreign exchange
reserves), since they can grow faster with lower interest rates and reduced
country risk-rate. In an opposite direction, countries with a less developed
national innovation system will be in persistent disequilibrium in their
current account, without a sustainable level of reserves, penalized by high
risk-rates and needing to maintain high real interest rates. The result is
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macroeconomic vulnerability, which has been the case for most Latin
American countries in the last two decades. He also notes that, paradoxi-
cally, developing countries that lack capital (and in theory should be
running deficits in their current accounts, i.e. importing capital), tend to be
punished by ‘globalized finance’ when they find themselves in a position of
running persistent deficits. The opposite is true for countries that run sur-
pluses, and which are able to enjoy both autonomy and favourable condi-
tions – in terms of interest rate policy, and even having the option of
placing selective controls on capital – although they could not enjoy the
position of being net importers of capital, but would rather continue to
base their economic performance on domestic savings.
Unlike the Bretton Woods system where the developing countries could
incur modest external deficits (financed by direct investment or official
loans) without imposing constraints on their interest rate policy, the
current system of ‘globalized financing’ adversely affects the ‘efficient allo-
cation’ of capital by punishing deficit countries and rewarding surplus
countries.
As a consequence, Coutinho (Chapter 12) points out that, in the 1990s,
the situation of the Brazilian (and Latin American) productive sector as a
whole became particularly fragile because of the following macroeconomic
aspects:
● weak competitive performance with outstanding trade fragility in all
sectors of high added value and high technological content;
● widespread loss of national ownership in many sectors, weakness and
reduced size of the remaining Brazilian business groups;
● persistent financial vulnerability of Brazilian-owned businesses
resulting from very high costs of capital and inexistence of long-term
financing mechanisms.
After further elaborating on these conclusions, his chapter concentrates on
examining and proposing an alternative industrial policy for Brazil at the
dawn of the 21st century.
LOCAL PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS IN BRAZIL FACING
THE GLOBALIZING LEARNING ECONOMY
Part 2 of this book presents the results of the empirical research carried out
in Brazil aiming at understanding local processes of learning and capabil-
ity accumulation The systems of innovation framework was used in the
analysis of ‘local productive systems and arrangements’. Following this
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conceptual framework we define a local productive system as any produc-
tive agglomeration involving economic, political and social agents localised
in the same area, performing related economic activities and presenting
consistent articulation, interaction, co-operation and learning processes. It
includes not only firms (producers of final goods and services, suppliers of
inputs and equipment, service providers, etc.) and their different forms of
representation and association, but also other public and private institu-
tions and organizations specialized in educating and training human
resources, R&D, engineering, promotion, financing, etc. We have also
developed the concept of local productive arrangements to include produc-
tive agglomerations, in which there is no (or almost no) articulation among
the agents and which, therefore, could not be considered as systems. The
development of this concept has been followed by a compatible empirical
methodology15 to gather information about the strengths and vulnerabil-
ities of Brazilian productive, innovative and learning processes. This
methodological framework covers micro, meso and macro elements influ-
encing the evolution of the arrangements. Chapters 13 to 21 in Part 2 of
this book comprise the analysis of ten selected case studies aiming mainly
at:
● characterizing the local productive arrangements, main economic
activities, products and services, firms, other public and private
organizations, institutions and co-ordination structure;
● discussing the conditions under which local learning, the accumula-
tion of productive and innovation capabilities and effective use of
these capacities occur;
● determining in what sense the type of governance, competition
pattern and market structure – local, national and international –
influence the evolution of the arrangement;
● investigating in what degree the competitiveness of the arrangement
is sustainable and dynamic regarding embeddedness, articulation
with the local system of innovation and main competitive elements
(product quality, value-added, productivity and labour);
● examining the influence of the 1990s and of local and national,
explicit and implicit policies on the evolution of the arrangements.
The resulting policy implications are summarized by Cassiolato, Villaschi
Filho and Campos in Chapter 23.
The map in figure 1.1 locates these ten empirical studies, selected from
the 26 productive arrangements analysed in Brazil and Uruguay, from 1998
to 2000 and Table 1.1 presents a summary of these cases. The first column
of the table comprises five cases of arrangements of SMEs without any
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local co-ordination by large firms. They produce mostly commodities. Two
are mainly geared to the external market (ornamental stones in Espírito
Santo and footwear in Rio Grande do Sul), others to the internal market
(footwear in Paraíba and ornamental stones in Rio de Janeiro), while the
arrangements for apparel target both external and internal markets.
The second column comprises three cases of arrangements dominated by
large firms. One is controlled by a local subsidiary of a TNC, the Italian
auto-maker Fiat. Another is dominated by a recently privatized locally con-
trolled large firm, the aircraft producer Embraer. The third is an arrange-
ment of local SMEs in the metallurgy-mechanics sector selling to large
firms, both locally owned and TNC subsidiaries. Although all these large
firms export, Fiat concentrates on the internal market, while the other two
cases could be considered export-intensive.
The third column consists of productive arrangements anchored by a
public entity, such as universities and research centres: telecom in São
Paulo state and soybean in Paraná. Both include locally owned SMEs and
large subsidiaries of TNCs.
SME Arrangements
Lemos and Palhano (Chapter 13) analyse the leather footwear arrangement
in Paraíba state, located in the poor northeast region of Brazil. The main
interest lies in its characteristics of production of traditional goods of low
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technological complexity, involving a significant number of formal and
informal micro and small firms. Local production targets a wide regional
low-income market. The authors found important interactions and links
among firms and between them and other institutions. These relate to
learning processes and to enhancing technical capability in this backward
productive environment. They also emphasize the negative impact of poli-
cies pursued during the 1990s on these interactions and learning processes.
Particularly worth mentioning is that the incentives for relocation of large
footwear firms from the south of the country to the northeast only resulted
in assemblage operations being located in the area, with no significant links
or impact on local capabilities.
A totally different case in the same sector is analysed by Vargas and
Alievi (Chapter 14). They investigate innovative and competitive trajecto-
ries in the leather footwear arrangement in Sinos Valley in Rio Grande do
Sul state in the far south of Brazil. This is perhaps one of the most studied
arrangements in the developing world, being a classical example of SMEs
participating in a global commodity chain (see Schmitz, Chapter 10). The
focus of the chapter is on the nature and intensity of co-operative linkages
and interactive learning mechanisms among actors within the arrange-
ment. It emphasizes the diverse upgrading strategies associated with differ-
ent market channels. On the one hand, a considerable number of firms
remain integrated in global commodity chains and maintain innovative
capabilities only in the sphere of production. On the other hand, some
firms have upgraded their innovative capabilities, entering into design and
marketing. During the 1990s, this latter group of firms managed to raise
exports to new market niches, but they are still an exception. The authors
discuss why and how co-operative behaviour significantly decreased in both
cases in the 1990s as compared with the previous decade.
Campos, Cário and Nicolau (Chapter 15) analyse the textile and cloth-
ing productive arrangement in the Itajai Valley in Santa Catarina state.
Spread throughout 32 towns, the arrangement is characterized by compris-
ing the most significant segments of the Brazilian textile and clothing
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Table 1.1 Surveyed local productive arrangements in Brazil – 2000
SME arrangements Arrangements Arrangements organized
controlled by large around government
firms institutions
Footwear (RS and PB) Aircraft (SP) Telecom (SP)
Apparel (SC) Automobile (MG) Soy (PR)
Ornamental stones (RJ and ES) Metal-mechanics (ES)
chain, including threading, weaving, dyeing and the manufacturing of
apparel. There are important local institutions, such as education, training
and research centres, consultancy and other service providers, producers’
associations and workers’ unions. However, co-operative learning happens
only ‘horizontally’ (among firms producing similar goods) with no ‘verti-
cal’ relations and very little interaction between firms and other institu-
tions. The authors suggest that the local institutional base for innovation is
‘non-structured and passive’, even though they recognize conditions for a
structured, active and co-operative innovation system.
Villaschi Filho, Pinto and Sabadini (Chapter 16) deal with different tra-
jectories in the exploitation of ornamental stones in two neighbouring
areas. One is located in Rio de Janeiro state; the other, in Espirito Santo
state, is the country’s largest exporter of marble and granite. Both special-
ize in low value-added goods and share a low concern with environmentally
safe production processes. The authors describe the local arrangements,
examining why spatial proximity in both cases has not been a sufficient ena-
bling factor in stimulating learning and co-operative processes. Innovation-
related learning is absent in both arrangements, but not because of a lack
of capabilities and knowledge at the local level. There are organizations,
both private and public, that can stimulate these activities and contribute
to creating dynamic capabilities. The authors also suggest the existence of
a vicious circle with short-sighted trade policies (‘export at any cost’)
leading to the exploitation of natural resources with low value-added and
a lack of concern with respect to local capabilities which could lead to an
increase in local content.
Arrangements Controlled by Large Firms
Lemos, Diniz, Santos, Crocco and Camargo (Chapter 18) analyse the auto-
mobile arrangement in Minas Gerais state. It is characterized as a hub and
spoke, with local governance based on a subsidiary of a TNC in which the
domestic market is strategic for the company’s competitive position. With
liberalization a rapid internationalization occurred: Italian firms acquired
all but one of Fiat’s first-tier suppliers. These changes led to a sharp decline
in R&D and other innovative efforts at the local level. Already existing sup-
pliers and new entrants started locating their innovative activities and deci-
sion-making centres in their headquarters in developed countries, basically
Italy. As a result, co-operative arrangements between Fiat and its suppliers
changed, as the requirements regarding the development of technological
capabilities became less important than the enhancement of technical and
managerial efficiency associated with particular processes.
Bernardes and Oliveira (Chapter 20) analyse the evolution of the São
26 Systems of innovation and development
Paulo aerospace productive arrangement. They investigate the innovation
regime, learning processes and technological relations among firms, and
local research and training institutions after the privatization of Embraer
in the mid-1990s. Embraer, the fourth largest aircraft producer in the world,
became in 1999 the largest Brazilian exporter, with US$ 1.8 billion in inter-
national sales. Their main findings point out that the lack of an efficient and
co-ordinated national policy for the sector has caused a paradoxical move-
ment impelled by the rapid globalization of Embraer’s commercial, pro-
ductive and technological activities. Although there was an improvement in
the management of the global production chain governed by Embraer,
mixed results in the development of innovation capabilities were found.
These include a concentration of innovation activities in the global produc-
tive network, and the weakening of the Brazilian innovation system as the
national supply base decreased.
Villaschi Filho and Lima (Chapter 21) deal with the interaction between
an SME local arrangement specialized in metal-mechanics and large com-
modity exporters – mainly steel, paper pulp and iron-ore/iron-ore pellets in
Espírito Santo state. These interactions have taken place through buying
orders placed by these anchor firms with local producers and through the
setting up of several programmes aimed at increasing their industrial capa-
bilities. Despite the good results that were achieved in the 1990s, their
chapter draws attention to the need to foster new types of co-operation
between the anchor enterprises and the SMEs of the system.
Arrangements Organized around Government Institutions
Paula, Porcile and Scatolin (Chapter 17) analyse the innovative institu-
tional arrangement organized around the development of new varieties of
soybean in the state of Paraná. From the 1970s, this arrangement experi-
enced considerable dynamism, largely due to the key role played by the
local branch of Embrapa (Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research,
a government-owned agricultural research institute). The authors stress
that Brazil is now a key player in the international soybean market thanks
to this local innovation system centred around Embrapa. The study differ-
entiates between two parts of the arrangement as far as technological and
market dynamism is concerned: one producing new cultivars and seeds;
and the other producing grains and crushing. It shows that only in the first
case do interactions between heterogeneous actors and different types of
technology create synergy, with a positive impact on the evolution of pro-
ductivity and competitiveness. The authors also discuss the consequences
of the new Law of Varieties (approved in April 1997) which introduced
royalty payments for new cultivars. Although the new configuration of the
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industry was still in a transitional period, some trends were noticed. These
include a concentration of the market structure through the entry of large
firms and the elimination of small firms, a higher rate of introduction of
new cultivars and the dismantling of co-operative mechanisms for testing
and assessing new cultivars. Exploring the policy implications of their dis-
cussion, the authors point to the need to avoid excessive market concentra-
tion and to foster the interactive learning process.
Szapiro (Chapter 19) analyses the telecom arrangement in the state of
São Paulo. During the 1970s and 1980s Brazil developed an innovative and
productive system of telecommunications in Campinas, constituted by
CPqD (the R&D Centre of Telebrás16), the State University of Campinas,
multinational subsidiaries and nationally owned equipment producers,
operators and other research institutions. Szapiro analyses the impacts of
structural reforms (liberalization, deregulation and privatization) on this
system in the 1990s, pointing out that besides its restructuring, new firms
were set up but several either disappeared or were acquired by foreign firms.
The author also (i) notes a decrease in the degree of collaboration between
carriers, equipment producers, research centres and regulatory bodies and
(ii) concludes that the processes of trade liberalization, privatization and
deregulation have led to the disarticulation of the local innovation system
and to the destruction of intangible assets of firms and institutions, deeply
affecting their core competences.
Synthesis of the Performance of Brazilian Productive Arrangements in the
1990s
There were some common features regarding how these selected Brazilian
arrangements coped with the transformations of the 1990s. In general most
firms’ competitive strategies concentrated on improving production organ-
ization, product quality and modernization of production processes, nor-
mally through equipment imports. On the one hand, there was an increase
in the learning capacity of firms, with emphasis on organizational effi-
ciency, skills and production organization. Most arrangements centred
their efforts on improving production processes, while only a few also
focused on developing new products.
On the other hand, reforms had also a negative impact on learning capa-
bilities. Collaborative efforts, in most of the cases studied, did not increase
in the 1990s, quite the opposite. In fact, the empirical results show that in
arrangements dominated by subsidiaries of TNCs, technological collabo-
ration significantly decreased during the period. Even in the cases where
collaboration increased – basically in arrangements controlled by local
firms that target their production to the internal market – a very slow
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increase in formal co-operation with local institutions and firms was
detected. The survey also confirmed that when co-operative relationships
occurred, they were mostly based on transfer of tacit knowledge and
implied a high level of informality. It was not the result of any deliberate
strategy.
Although the export profile of the Brazilian economy has evolved in such
a way that industrialized goods are increasingly important, their insertion
in the international market is still characterized by exports of commodities
that are intensive in natural resources and/or energy and generate low
wages. These commodities have shown a tendency for low dynamism,
excess supply and price stagnation.
To sum up, the main conclusions of the research project on local produc-
tive and innovative systems in Brazil have provided evidence that, in the
1990s, with few exceptions, instead of being reinforced:
● productive and innovative efforts were decreasing;
● productive and innovative networks were disarticulated (with no sig-
nificant articulation between the new investments and local agents);
● the level of employment of specialized personnel decreased.
Arocena and Sutz (Chapter 11) also discuss a number of similar examples
observed in Latin America of this process that they call ‘de-learning,’
emphasizing the consequences of weakening the socio-technical capabil-
ities accumulated over a long time without replacing them.
Katz (2000), in his analysis of the impact of structural reforms on the
Latin American economy, also suggests that, although the process of struc-
tural reforms of the 1990s was successful in restoring macroeconomic equi-
librium in most countries of the region it did not bring any significant
improvement in terms of productive efficiency and distributive equity. His
findings also coincide with ours in that most of the productivity gains were
obtained by traditional sectors. At the same time, knowledge intensive
sectors lost ground. More than that, the productive gains observed in tra-
ditional sectors were associated with both employment reduction and
diminishing importance of local content, affecting mostly local SMEs.
However, the discussion in Part 2 of this volume also shows that, despite
the difficulties, all the surveyed arrangements have survived. Firms face a
very uncertain future but were capable of restructuring and adapting to the
new environment. Some are even moving towards more complex produc-
tion systems. This also happens to local institutions, including those in
charge of fostering co-operation among actors and promoting learning and
capacity building. A particular feature of the Brazilian productive arrange-
ments continues to be their institutional density. In this sense the analysis
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of the case studies showed that the arrangements retain the basic condi-
tions on which virtuous processes could be built.
The empirical chapters provide very rich and detailed information
about strengths and weaknesses of the arrangements as well as policy rec-
ommendations. The analysis reinforces the idea that it is not only the
importance of local aspects that matters, providing evidence that there are
important elements of the national and international dimensions that
obstruct or favour their evolution. In every sense, the conclusions of the
empirical studies are the result of the policies adopted in Brazil in this
period – inspired by the structural reforms model – which have contrib-
uted to conform to a ‘malign macroeconomic regime’, as characterized by
Coutinho (Chapter 12). Instead of fostering local capabilities, the ‘com-
petitive insertion’ model, adopted in Brazil and other Latin American
countries, assumed that:
● the opening of the economies and the attraction of foreign invest-
ment would be the best way to improve the manner and the degree of
integration of these economies in the world market;
● technology, innovation and knowledge could be globalized; and like
a commodity, could be acquired internationally under market condi-
tions.17
The economic results obtained in the period question the appropriateness
and effectiveness of the policies adopted regarding their very basic target:
increase of competitiveness and a positive insertion in the globalization
process.18
CONCLUSION
Three interrelated points mobilize the discussion on the need for new forms
of policies to foster productive arrangements in developing countries. One
refers to the challenge of transforming existing arrangements into dynamic
and innovative systems. That is, how to foster and support an agglomera-
tion of firms and other institutions in their process of becoming an articu-
lated group of agents that can collaborate in production, innovation,
design, marketing, commercialization, and so on. The second point relates
to the need to create conditions to allow the emergence of new productive
arrangements and systems. In this case the challenge is also to give them
conditions to grow and sustain their growth.
Some of the authors advance into the discussion of policy implications
and also deal with a challenge, whose importance was emphasized by
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Schmitz (Chapter 10) and Diniz (Chapter 7) – the need to articulate poli-
cies and institutions of different scope. This refers to two lines of ideas. The
first is that there is no single (and common) magic formula to be applied in
all cases. The second refers to the need to articulate different levels (from
the local to the national and international) and kinds of policies as well as
intervening institutions. As noted by Diniz:
this task requires a permanent effort, which depends on the creation or strength-
ening of local coordinating agencies, such as local development agencies, labour
unions, entrepreneurial associations, or other forms of local coordination. As
each locality or region has its own characteristics, it is not possible to suggest or
implement uniform structures’ (p. 000)
Thirdly and more importantly, there is a need to establish adequate
macroeconomic conditions, not only to allow these two other targets to be
fulfilled, but also to reverse the situation of destruction of existing local
productive and innovative capacities that had been previously accumu-
lated, as documented in this book.
Of course it is acknowledged that there is much ‘destruction’ occurring
all over the world, not only in Brazil and other developing countries.
However, the serious economic and social situation confronting LDCs
almost without exception calls for an urgent start of a concerted and con-
tinuous phase of ‘creation’ instead of destruction. Creating and sustaining
opportunities for learning and innovating should be at the centre of the new
public and private strategies and policies targeting the promotion of the
capacity to acquire and use knowledge.
We have argued that one of the main problems facing Brazil and other
Latin American countries, and which endures at the beginning of the mil-
lennium, results from at least a very poor understanding of the nature and
consequences of the transformations, as well as their impacts on these
countries. Policies adopted in most of Latin America reflect these mis-
understandings.19 This is particularly true and worrisome because we are
living in a phase of radical transformations, when new patterns of develop-
ment are being shaped.
Defining and implementing effective policies to cope with such a complex
situation are not easy tasks. More importantly, as argued in Part 1 and doc-
umented in Part 2 of this volume, general conditions for implementing pol-
icies significantly deteriorated in the 1990s. However, another argument
here is that one main reason for the crisis of adaptation to the new patterns
refers precisely to the delay in designing appropriate policies and instru-
ments to cope with them. Hence the need to advance towards an adequate
understanding of the characteristics and impacts of the new pattern of
accumulation and to design and implement policies, taking into account
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local, national and international conditions for development as well as the
changes associated with new forms of governance at world level.
We believe that the discussion offered by the different authors in this
book represents an important contribution in this direction. We also hope
to stimulate developing countries to formulate their own intellectual
frameworks; to adopt analytical approaches capable of dealing with their
new challenges and opportunities; to find their own paths and rhythms of
development; and to define and implement the most adequate related
policies.
NOTES
1. ‘Simply defined, a learning economy is an economy where the ability to learn is crucial
for the economic success of individuals, firms, regions and national economies. Learning
refers to building new competencies and establishing new skills and not just getting
access to information’ (Johnson and Lundvall, Chapter 5, p. 000).
2. Two years after the conclusion of the first versions of these papers, more than US$ 7 tril-
lion were written off from the US stock market, many ‘dot.com’ firms have collapsed and
a series of frauds of firms such as Enron and WorldCom have confirmed their predic-
tions and concerns.
3. Chesnais and Sauviat note that there are, however, important exceptions to this pattern
in countries where (i) the government remains as the focal point in the national system
of innovation; (ii) the process of privatization faces internal political opposition and (iii)
the need for a continuous public support for science and technology is still recognized
(see Chapter 3).
4. ‘These institutions – universities, but also scientific academies, learned societies and net-
works of exchanges of people and ideas– ruled the attitudes and codes of behaviour for
the disclosure, the critical inspection and discussion, and the circulation and availability
of new knowledge. Over the last 20 years these codes of behaviour (the “ethics” of sci-
entific research) and in particular the norm of rapid and total disclosure have been sub-
jected to ever increasing pressure’ (Chesnais and Sauviat, Chapter 3, p. 000).
5. See Freeman (1991); Lastres (1993) and (1997).
6. About these issues see also Fiori (1995); Tavares and Fiori (1997); Furtado (1998).
7. Among others Smith (1999) also pointed out that the fishing sector, normally character-
ized as low-tech, could be characterized nowadays as knowledge intensive (and even
high-tech), for the increasing use of new materials and design concepts in ships, fishing
equipment and pond technologies; computer imaging and pattern recognition technol-
ogies, satellite communications, global positioning systems, safety systems, sonar tech-
nologies, optical technologies for monitoring and sorting fish; nutrition technologies
based on biotechnology and genetic research, etc.
8. For details see www.ie.ufrj.br/redesist.
9. As for instance noted by Chesnais and Sauviat, ‘Following the dismantling of industrial
and technological development policy instruments as well as of trade protection, there
is a sudden realization that history, in the form of national trajectories shaping social
behaviour, matters. . . . This renewed importance of historical trajectories is of course
one of the clues to understanding why, paradoxically, interest in national systems of
innovation grew along side the onset of globalization’ (p. 000).
10. For more details see Albagli and Maciel (2002) and Maciel (2002).
11. See, for instance, Studart (1995), Melo (1996), Cassiolato and Lastres (2000).
12. For more details about the development of these ideas in the Brazilian case, see Mytelka
(2001) and also Vargas, Cassiolato and Britto (2001).
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13. See, among others, Villaschi (1993); Melo (1996); Girvan (1996); Viotti (1997), Sutz
(1999), Katz (1999), Arocena and Sutz (2000a).
14. See Cassiolato (1992) and Sagasti (1978).
15. For details of this methodology, including the three types of questionnaires developed
to base the field-work, see www.ie.ufrj.br/redesist. The results of the work developed by
the research network established in 1997 are also available there.
16. Telebrás was the government holding of the telecom system in Brazil until its privatiza-
tion in the mid-1990s.
17. For details see Lastres and Cassiolato (2000).
18. Attempts to accelerate the integration by attracting foreign capital resulted in an effec-
tive increase of foreign direct investment (FDI). The flows of foreign investment
increased from US$ 8 billion in 1990 to US$ 67.3 billion in 1998, and the stock of FDI
grew 60 per cent in the period (Mortimore, 1999). Although inflows in the 1990s were
approximately 13 times those observed during the 1970s, economic growth was 50 per
cent lower. It is worth noting that FDI in the 1990s was mostly directed to mergers and
acquisitions of existing firms rather than ‘greenfield’ investment. Also, and contrary to
what was planned, these new investments were basically import-intensive and not geared
to exports, targeting mostly local markets. An additional great concern relates to the sus-
tainability of this situation.
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